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In a nutshell: Researchers from the University of Vermont have developed a self-destructing mechanism that, when triggered, can render hardware useless. The techniques can serve as both a security measure and a way to thwart counterfeiters, we are told.
The team shared their findings during the recent IEEE International Solid-State Circuits Conference (ISSCC) in San Francisco. Their methods work alongside physically unclonable functions (PUFs), which utilize unique characteristics in individual transistors to create code that acts like a unique digital fingerprint.
When compromised, the system can boost operating voltage across circuits to trigger electromigration – literally blowing metal atoms out of place to create open circuits and voids. A similar method can also be used to increase the operating voltage from less than one volt to around 2.5 V, which accelerates time-dependent dielectric breakdown to create short circuits. Translation – death.
The team, led by Eric Hunt-Schroeder, worked with Marvell Technology on the project. Hunt-Schroeder said he was inspired to develop the self-destructing mechanisms after reading that researchers were able to use a scanning electron microscope to clone SRAM-based PUFs.
The technique could also be effective in preventing counterfeit chips from flooding the market. When a company is done with a chip, Hunt-Schroeder noted, they can ensure it is destroyed in a way that makes it useless.
The self-destructing system was one of a handful of novel security techniques highlighted during the conference.
A team from Columbia University showcased a solution that is able to detect if a probe has been attached to a circuit, which could be helpful in defending against attacks in which the bad actor has physical access to a system.
At UT Austin, meanwhile, researchers came up with a way to mask signals emanating from power and electromagnetic sources. In testing, the team was able to capture a key from an unprotected chip after about 500 attempts. With their protections in place, they were unable to crack the key even after 40 million tries.
Image credit: Alexandre Debieve, Zan